Trust boundaries

Trust boundaries

Reference · guarantees

A guarantee you cannot state precisely is not a guarantee. This page says where the Aarmos boundary begins, where it ends, and how the system behaves when part of it is unreachable.

What Aarmos guarantees

  • Decide

    A proposed consequence that reaches a supported governed origin is evaluated against applicable policy and Authority before dispatch.

  • Prove

    A supported artifact can be checked offline against a supplied trust root. The standalone command-line verifier is not currently publicly distributed.

  • Bind

    Where supported and the issuer participates, a credential can be bound to the authority context that justified it. The binding remains independently checkable with the required artifacts and supplied trust material.

What it does not

  • · Payload visibility depends on the supported Aarmos boundary. Coarse network mediation lacks request-body semantics; structured adapters may handle information required by the declared consequence and evidence contract.
  • · Aarmos is not an identity provider and not a secrets manager, and Aarmos-hosted services do not hold custody of the provider keys you enter. Those keys are stored in your browser's local storage on your device (encrypted when you set a device password) and are sent from your device to the provider you configured when a call uses them.
  • · Aarmos does not detect anomalies or classify data by scanning it. Classification is declared.
  • · A workload that is not enrolled is outside the boundary. Nothing infers it into scope.
  • · Aarmos does not inspect payloads on paths outside a supported boundary, and does not claim whole-host or whole-network enforcement.

Threats in scope

  • Policy attenuation

    A delegated action is bounded by its parent; a child cannot grant itself more than the invite provided.

  • Tenant binding

    A receipt's tenant is bound in the policy hash; a mismatch fails offline verification.

  • Metering before dispatch

    Call ceilings and repeat guards are decremented before dispatch, so a crash mid-call does not double-spend.

  • Workspace vault isolation

    Tokens and bearer profiles are stamped to the workspace that wrote them; another active workspace cannot read, list, or delete them.

  • Connector egress

    Destination and network safeguards apply at supported structured boundaries, scoped to traffic that reaches those boundaries. An unavailable check is never turned into an affirmative result.

Out of scope

  • Compromised device

    If the host is compromised or a browser extension has full page access, in-memory secrets are reachable regardless of the vault. The vault protects against opportunistic script access, not full host compromise.

  • Model provider

    With a customer-configured LLM provider, prompt content leaves the device when it reaches the provider. Redaction runs before dispatch; it cannot recall what was sent.

  • Tool-call latency

    The gate is the policy check only. Network, model, and I/O time of the underlying tool call are outside it.

  • Trust material freshness

    Evidence remains verifiable only while the artifact, trust material, and verifier remain available. Verification does not establish freshness of trust material on a new machine.

Report vulnerabilities to support@aarmatix.com — security reports are an accepted category of inquiry. The mailbox receives email but is not yet continuously monitored; response times are not guaranteed.

How coverage is reported

Coverage is reported as counts and named gaps, never as a share. A share needs a denominator — the set of every workload that exists — and that set is not observable. Enrolled workloads carry one of three attestation states:

  • complete — every observed call was named by an adapter.
  • partial — some calls were adapter-named; others were seen as a hostname only.
  • unattested — enrolled by declaration, nothing observed yet.

Declared data contracts

A workload declares the shape of what it sends and receives — field names, a classification per field, and a purpose. The receipt carries a commitment over that declaration, never the values. A field that was never declared is recorded at coverage level unobserved; absence of a declaration is recorded, never read as clean.

Authority-bound credentials

Credentials used by governed workloads are bound to an evaluated authority context. Aarmos answers whether a credential should exist for this principal, this purpose, and this window — not who mints it and not where it is stored. Issuance stays with your existing identity or secrets system. Short validity windows carry the guarantee; revocation is best-effort.

Aarmos does not replace the credential issuer or secrets manager. Credential custody, rotation, and scope remain with your identity or secrets infrastructure. A supported boundary handles only the credential context required for its documented operation; evidence does not record credential values.

Three assurance states

Resources are reported in exactly one of three states. Nothing is rounded up, and a resource whose issuer cannot mint directly is reported honestly rather than reclassified.

Authority Bound

The issuer participates: credentials are minted directly to the workload against an evaluated authority context, and the binding verifies offline.

Policy Governed

The gate decides and the receipt proves, but the credential exists independently of the authority. No binding.

Observed

Activity is recorded without a governed decision path.

If an enterprise needs an intermediary between the decision and its token service, that broker is theirs and sits outside the Aarmos boundary: decision → your credential broker → your STS → workload.

When something is unreachable

Aarmos control plane unreachable

Previously issued bindings stay valid until they expire; workloads continue within granted authority. No new bindings are minted.

Credential issuer unreachable

No new credential is issued. Existing bound credentials continue until expiry. The gap is reported as a posture degradation, never silently absorbed.

Binding expired

The workload loses authority. Fail closed. Renewal is a governed action requiring a fresh evaluation.

Revocation requested but unpropagated

Best-effort, and documented as such. The guarantee is carried by the validity window, and the window length is a published policy input.

Binding verification unavailable to the relying party

The relying party fails closed and records an unverified_binding disclosure at coverage level unobserved. Absence of verification is never treated as success.

Check it yourself

Contracts and bindings are designed to verify from the artifacts alone — no service of ours has to be reachable. The wire format specification is not currently publicly published, and the Aarmos CLI is not publicly distributed: the commands below are reference examples, not instructions you can run today.

aarmos boundary contract-commit contract.json
aarmos boundary verify-contract contract.json sha256:… --observed customer_id,ssn
aarmos boundary verify-binding binding.json --credential-id <credential-id>

Background: information governance · independent verification